Th is paper introduces a new probabilistic approach to sovereign debt projections and presents new estimates of debt ratios through 2020 for Italy and Spain. Th e new approach takes account of likely correlations across 243 alternative scenarios with three states (good, baseline, bad) for fi ve key variables (growth, interest rate, primary surplus, bank recapitalization, and privatization). Th e 25th and 75th percentile scenarios are reported, as are the baseline and probability-weighted outcomes. Th e results suggest sovereign debt is sustainable in both Italy (where debt ratios are likely to decline because of a high primary surplus) and Spain (where the ratios rise but at a decelerating pace and from relatively low levels).
INTRODUCTION
A debt simulation model provides a useful basis for analyzing the sustainability of sovereign debt. Th e basic premise is that if, under reasonable assumptions, the relevant debt ratios show a prospective path of moderation over time, or (for a country with a high debt ratio which is nonetheless still able to access the capital market) at least avoidance of worsening over time, then a country is judged solvent and capable of carrying its sovereign debt load without restructuring or partial forgiveness. Th is study sets forth such a model, the European Debt Simulation Model (EDSM).
1 Th e model combines exogenous information, in particular on interest rates and the time profi le of maturities coming due for long-term debt already outstanding, with alternative scenarios for key policy and market variables. Th e scenario variables apply alternative cases for: real GDP growth rates, the primary fi scal surplus, the interest rate on new mediumand long-term debt, the amount of public outlay needed for bank recapitalization or other forms of "discovered debt," and the amount of prospective receipts from privatization. As discussed below, with three alternative states (base case, unfavorable, favorable) and fi ve variables, there are 243 outcomes for the model. Th is study develops an approach to considering the correlation among the contingent states to provide a sense of the probability distribution of the various outcomes.
Th e policy context for this study is the centrality of debt sustainability in both Italy and Spain in determining whether the euro area can resolve its debt problem without far more severe economic disruption than has already taken place in the region. If either or especially both countries were forced into some form of sovereign default and/or exit from the euro, the likely damage to the euro area economy and the world economy would be large. In Cline (2012a) , I argued that Spain's initially low ratio of debt to GDP gave it considerable room for maneuver. In Cline (2012b) , I conducted selected simulations of the EDSM to examine Italy's debt, and concluded that because of a relatively favorable maturity structure of medium-term debt Italy could sustain even relatively high interest rates (over 7 percent) for a number of years so long as it met its primary surplus targets, but that some form of fi rewall would be highly desirable to ensure that the interest rates did not surge far higher and impose a self-fulfi lling prophecy of insolvency.
Th e new calculations in this study seek to shed more light on the case of Spain, where in recent months market rates have refl ected relatively high concern about debt sustainability, and in addition, apply the new probabilistic approach incorporating scenario correlation for the case of Italy.
1. An earlier version of the model was applied in Cline (2011; 2012b) .
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THE MODEL
Th e horizon of the model is through 2020, or for year t = 1 to 9 for 2012 through 2020. Nominal GDP is calculated as:
where Y is GDP in billions of current euros, g is the real growth rate, and is the GDP defl ator (with the overdot representing proportionate increase).
Th e fi scal defi cit (DEF) for the year equals the interest (INT) due on public debt minus the primary
surplus (PS):
Th e interest due is calculated as the sum across three public debt categories of the stock of debt at the end of the previous year multiplied by the interest rate applicable for the current year, with debt divided into short-term (one year or less), "old" medium-and long-term debt outstanding at the end of 2011, and "new" medium-and long-term debt incurred in 2012 and after. Because interest is earned on government fi nancial assets, the net interest relevant for the contribution to the defi cit deducts such interest earnings. Th us:
where D is the stock of debt, k = 1 to 3 is the category, r is the interest rate, FA is the stock of public sector fi nancial assets, and subscript a refers to assets.
Th e primary surplus is the scenario's postulated rate π as applied to nominal GDP, or:
For the year in question, the net borrowing requirement (NBR) is then equal to the fi scal defi cit, plus the amount of extraordinary increase in debt attributable to recognition of arrears, capital payment in support of banks, or other non-budgetary increase in debt, designated here as DDIS for "debt discovery;" minus the amount of receipts obtained from privatization, Z.
Th e gross borrowing requirement will then equal the net borrowing requirement plus amortization (AMZ), plus the amount needed to cover the increase in public fi nancial assets (FA). For its part, amortization in turn will equal the sum of short-term debt to be rolled over (D 1t ) plus the year's principal maturities on medium-and long-term debt outstanding at the end of 2011 (A 2t ), plus amortization 4 coming due on the outstanding stock of medium-and long-term debt newly incurred in 2012 and thereafter (A 3t ):
; Th e schedule of amortization on old medium-and long-term debt (A 2 ) is known from Treasury data. It is assumed that the amortization due on newly acquired medium-and long-term debt is a fi xed proportion  of the previous year's outstanding post-2011 medium-and long-term debt, with the calculations applying  = 0.1 to represent 10-year maturities. Th e calculations also assume that short-term debt remains constant, at D 1t = D 1,0 where D 1,0 is the amount outstanding at the end of 2011.
Th e amount of new borrowing of medium-and long-term debt (B 3t ) will then be the gross borrowing requirement minus the amount of short-term debt being rolled over, or:
Th e outstanding stock of short-term debt is constant at D 1,0 . Th e outstanding stock of old mediumand long-term debt is the previous year-end total less the amount amortized during the year. Outstanding new (post-2011) medium-and long-term debt equals the amount at the end of the previous year, plus the amount of new medium-and long-term borrowing, minus amortization on this debt. Th us:
For their part, public fi nancial assets at the end of the year equal the amount at the end of the previous year plus the increment during the course of the year: FA t = FA t-1 + FA t .
Equations 1 through 9 are accounting relationships that yield paths of debt, net debt, interest payments, and amortization, all of which when compared to GDP provide alternative indicators of the debt burden. Th e economic infl uences driving the accounting outcomes are, again, the key variables allowed to vary across the scenarios: growth, primary surplus, interest rate on new long-term debt, bank recapitalization and other debt discovery, and privatization.
CONTINGENT STATE CORRELATION
Appendix A develops a method for taking into account the correlation of "contingent states" (good, bad, central) across the key economic variables for purposes of identifying the relative probabilities of alternative outcomes. Th e point of departure is the specifi cation of a base case for each variable (a time path of the central expectation for the variable, in this case for 2012 through 2020). An adverse "bad" time path and favorable "good" path are then identifi ed, fl anking the base case. With three possible states for fi ve variable-time paths, there will be 3 5 = 243 possible outcomes.
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As developed in the appendix, there can be positive or negative correlation between pairs of states.
For example, the "good" growth state is likely to be positively correlated with the "good" market interest rate case because as investors observe stronger growth performance they will be more willing to purchase government bonds at moderate interest rates. Conversely, a "good" state on one variable can be negatively correlated with that on another variable (i.e., correlated with that variable's bad state). For privatization, for example, if there is greater success raising the primary surplus there will be less pressure to raise funds through the substitute means of privatization. Th e "bad" state of less privatization receipts will be correlated with the "good" state of a high primary surplus.
Th e specifi cation of scenario probabilities applied in this study is as follows. Other things being equal, the probability that a given variable will be at its "base" case is 40 percent; at its "good" case, 30 percent; and at its "bad" case, 30 percent. However, if another variable with which the variable in question is correlated (with coeffi cient unity) is at the same non-base state as is the variable (both in their "good" states, for example), then the probability that the variable in question is in its good state is increased by an additive amount, and the probability that the variable in question is in its bad state is correspondingly reduced by this amount. As discussed in appendix A, in the extreme case in which the variable's state is positively correlated with each of the other key variable states, and all of the variables are in the same non-base state, the probability of the variable's non-base state is at its maximum, set at 0.45, and the probability of the opposite non-base state is at is minimum, set at 0.15. Th e scenario probabilities are then normalized so that they sum to unity.
Th e eff ect of calculating the scenario probabilities taking account of scenario correlation across the key variables is to provide a basis for examining the likely range of outcomes based on a particular criterion. For this purpose the estimates here consider the ratio of debt to GDP. Th e various outcomes are arrayed from best to worst and then the paths representing cumulative 25th percentiles and 75th percentiles are identifi ed, as indicative of the most meaningful range of outcomes. Th e base case is also identifi ed (in which each key variable has its base case path). Finally, the probability-weighted path is identifi ed. Only by chance will it lie along the base case path.
Th e calculations in this study apply the correlation coeffi cients shown in table 1, corresponding to the coeffi cient  in appendix A.
Th e correlation coeffi cient between growth and the primary surplus is set to be positive but at a relatively low level of 0.2. Th e revenue outcome will tend to be strong when growth is strong, making for a positive correlation. However, in the context of fi scal adjustment with still relatively high unemployment, the eff ort to increase the primary surplus can have a negative impact on growth, eroding what would usually be a positive correlation.
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Proceeding across the fi rst row of the table, the correlation between the states (but not the levels, which are the reverse) for growth and interest rates is set at positive unity. As just suggested, investors are likely to take heart when they see stronger growth, and purchase government bonds with a lesser risk premium. Conversely, if they see severe economic contraction, they are more likely to insist on a high risk premium. Th e good states will be correlated with the good states and the bad ones with the bad ones. Th e correlation could be the other way around under more normal circumstances. Th us, when the economy is booming and refi nancing public debt is not a problem but infl ationary pressures are a concern, the central bank would likely increase interest rates.
Still in the fi rst row, a positive correlation is posited between the growth state and the bank recapitalization and debt discovery state (again, state, not amount, which is the reverse). Stronger growth is likely to be associated with lesser need to bail out the banks, and lesser incidence of provincial fi scal gaps that need to be made up at the center. Th e good growth state will be associated with the good bank recapitalization state, and their respective bad states similarly associated. Th e correlation is set at less than unity, however, as legacy problems may leave substantial discovered debt (and bank recapitalizations) even in the good growth case.
For the fi nal entry in the fi rst row, countervailing directions seem suffi cient to posit a zero correlation between growth and privatization. Although high growth would boost revenue and make privatization less urgent, the revenue eff ect is dealt with directly in the correlation between the primary surplus and privatization. Th ere might be a weak association the other direction: Poor growth might raise the concern that any privatizations would be at fi re-sale prices, so the "bad" state for growth would be associated with the "bad" state of low privatization eff ort. On balance the two are treated as neutral with respect to each other.
In the second row of the table, the fi rst entry has already been discussed: the correlation of the growth state with the primary surplus state. Th e fi rst new entry is for the correlation of the primary surplus state with the interest rate state. Th is coeffi cient is set at -0.5, meaning loosely that about half of the time the primary surplus will be in its good state (high) when the interest rate is in its bad state (high) but otherwise the two will not be associated. Th e motivation is that if the country faces higher interest rates, it will need to make a greater fi scal eff ort to compensate. Th e negative association between the states is moderated to the extent that investors reward the government with lower interest rates as they observe more ambitious fi scal eff ort. Once again the correlation could be in the opposite direction in the absence of debt stress, as unusually strong growth might prompt infl ationary concerns and induce the central bank to raise interest rates.
Th e next entry in the second row of table 1 indicates a zero correlation between the primary surplus and bank recapitalization (discovered debt). Th e fi nal entry in that row indicates a correlation of negative unity between the primary surplus state and the privatization state, because the two are essentially substitutes as sources of cash available to the government.
In the third row of the table, the fi rst entry not yet discussed is for the correlation of the interest rate state with the bank recapitalization state. Th is coeffi cient is set at positive unity, on grounds that banks are likely to be under greater stress when the sovereign is under greater stress from higher risk premiums in market interest rates. Finally in this row, the correlation between privatization and the interest rate states is set at zero, for reasons similar to those discussed above for a zero correlation of the growth performance with the privatization eff ort.
Th e fi nal correlation not yet discussed is between the extent of bank recapitalization (and debt discovery) on the one hand and privatization on the other. Th e two are treated as being independent of each other (zero correlation coeffi cient). Table 2 reports the 2012-20 time paths for the unfavorable (1), baseline (2), and favorable (3) For bank recapitalization outlays and other discovered debt, the estimates begin with the WEO estimate of €36 billion in 2012 for recognition of regional government arrears. 5 Th is is the fi gure applied in the favorable scenario. In the baseline scenario, it is also assumed that €5 billion must be allocated by the government to assist in bank recapitalizations, in view of the range of losses already reported by Bankia in particular. Th e baseline assumes that Spain is successful in obtaining other bank recapitalization amounts from support from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) directly to the banks without this support winding up in sovereign debt, as agreed in principle in the euro area summit meeting in late June, subject to prior successful establishment of central supervision for euro area banks. 6 In contrast, in the unfavorable scenario, it is assumed that the full amount of bank recapitalization needs accrues to a corresponding increase in sovereign debt.
SCENARIOS FOR SPAIN
7 Th e total amount of debt increase from banking recapitalization (as opposed to recognition of regional arrears) is set at €50 billion in this case, the range identified in recent outside reviews of the Spanish banks.
8
Finally, the privatization outlook is set at zero in both the baseline and unfavorable cases, but at a total of €15 billion over three years in the favorable scenario, based on earlier discussions of privatizing airports and the national lottery prior to the current government's suspension of such efforts because of unfavorable conditions. 9 Figure 1 shows four alternative projections for the ratio of gross public debt to GDP in Spain: the baseline, the paths at the 25th percentile and the 75th percentile across the 243 outcomes, and the probability-weighted average outcome. In the baseline, Spain's sovereign debt rises from 68 percent of GDP in 2011 to 80 percent in 2012 and 84 percent in 2013, and thereafter gradually increases to reach 89 percent of GDP by 2020. Considering that Germany's 2011 ratio of public debt to GDP was 81.5 percent (IMF 2012a), the prospective baseline range for Spain is hardly one representing massive overindebtedness. Th e baseline broadly confi rms the diagnosis in Cline (2012a) that because Spain started from a low debt ratio, it should be able to manage its prospective defi cits without becoming insolvent. Th us, in the baseline, Spain's gross public debt would reach 89 percent of GDP by 2020 (table B1) , the same level as for France in 2012. (IMF 2012a) . Th e probability-weighted ratio of gross debt to GDP would be only slightly higher, at 92 percent. Even though the ratio is still rising by 2020 in the probability-weighted case, the slope of the increase by then is extremely fl at, and at that rate of increase the debt ratio by 2030 would still be under 100 percent-well below the 120 percent that has come to be the benchmark (based on Italy) for a sustainable debt ratio in the euro area.
ScenarioS for italy
RESULTS FOR SPAIN
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Th e 25th percentile path indicates that on the favorable side the debt ratio would stabilize at 85 percent; the 75th percentile path indicates instead that the ratio would reach 99 percent by 2020 and still be rising. Th e probability-weighted outcome is an expected debt ratio of 92 percent of GDP by 2020, only slightly higher than in the baseline. As discussed in appendix D, the fact that the probabilityweighted outcome is less favorable than the baseline is attributable to the "distance" between the baseline on the one hand and the favorable and unfavorable extremes on the other hand. Th is distance is greater on the adverse side, in the scenarios constructed here, so the eff ect of giving equal probability to the adverse and favorable alternative scenarios is to make the probability-weighted outcome more adverse than the baseline. As examined in appendix D, the incorporation of correlations across the non-base scenarios pushes the 25th and 75th percentile paths closer to the extremes but has minimal eff ect on the probability-weighted outcome.
Th e April WEO (IMF 2012a) gave a somewhat more pessimistic projection of Spain's public debt, indicating that by 2017 it would reach 92 percent of GDP. Th is level is modestly higher than the 2017 baseline estimate here of 88 percent, and refl ects the fact that the IMF has a relatively pessimistic view of the scope for increasing the primary surplus in Spain (as discussed above). Even so, the IMF's debt projection yields almost the same outcome as the probability-weighted estimate here (90 percent for 2017).
11. Th e probability-weighted debt ratio rises from 90 percent to 92 percent from 2016 to 2020, or by 0.5 percent per year.
As shown in appendix B (fi gure B1), Spain's net public debt (after subtracting public fi nancial assets) rises from 57 percent of GDP in 2011 to 68 percent in 2012 and 72 percent in 2013, and then gradually rises to reach 78 percent of GDP by 2020. Net interest (fi gure B2) rises from 2.5 percent of GDP in 2012 to 4 percent by 2020, a relatively high level. Table B1 reports full details of the baseline projections for Spain. Figure 2 shows the path of debt relative to GDP for Italy in the baseline, 25th and 75th percentiles, and probability-weighted average outcome. In the baseline, Italy's debt ratio peaks at 123 percent of GDP in 2012-13 and then declines to 104 percent by 2020. In the favorable 25th percentile the decline would be to 100 percent. Even in the unfavorable 75th percentile the debt ratio would decline moderately, to 116 percent by 2020. Th e probability-weighted debt ratio declines from a peak of 123 percent in 2012 to 109 percent by 2020. Th e diff erence between the baseline and probability-weighted cases is modestly larger for
RESULTS FOR ITALY
Italy than Spain, refl ecting (among other infl uences) the fact that in Italy the unfavorable case allows for a wider shortfall of the primary surplus from the path assumed in the baseline.
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Th e baseline projection for Italy's ratio of gross debt to GDP is qualitatively similar to, but slightly more favorable than, that in Cline (2012b) , as the baseline here assumes that the primary surplus remains at the IMF's high projected level of 5.1 percent in 2017 and after, rather than easing to 3.5 percent after 2017 as assumed in my earlier projections. Th e baseline here is almost the same as that of the WEO through the year 2017 (here the debt ratio is 116 percent in that year; the WEO estimate is 118 percent), and the probability-weighted debt ratio is the same here (118 percent) as the WEO baseline estimate.
As shown in appendix B (fi gure B3), net debt peaks at 103 percent of GDP in 2013 and declines to 88 percent in the baseline. Net interest payments (fi gure B4) rise from 4.3 percent of GDP in 2012 to a peak of 5.4 percent in 2016, before easing to 4.9 percent again by 2020 in the baseline, refl ecting the relatively high interest burden emphasized in Cline (2012b) and underscoring the importance of achieving the high primary surplus. Table B2 reports full projection details for the baseline for Italy.
VULNERABILITY TO MARKET SHOCKS AND POLICY SLIPPAGE
Over the course of the past year the central question in the European debt crisis has been whether market interest rates facing the two large at-risk countries, Italy and Spain, would spiral out of control in the same fashion as had happened to Ireland, Portugal, and especially Greece. Th us, market rates on 10-year bonds 12. Th e ratio between the probability-weighted and baseline debt ratios in 2020 is 1.048:1 for Italy and 1.034 for Spain. Th e annual average gap between the baseline and unfavorable primary surplus paths for 2014-20 is 1.35 percent of GDP for Spain but 2.13 percent for Italy. For further discussion see appendix D.
reached peaks of about 13.5 percent for both Ireland (in August 2011) and Portugal (in March 2012), and the peak reached in Greece was almost 50 percent (March 2012). 13 Rates fell substantially from their peaks for Ireland (to about 6.5 percent by July 2012) and Portugal (to about 10.5 percent).
In contrast, peak interest rates for Italy and Spain have been much more manageable, reaching 7.3 percent in Italy (in late November 2011) and 7.6 percent in Spain (in late July 2012; fi gure 3). Th e debt drama in Europe has broadly involved a tug of war between the markets, on the one hand, and the euro area authorities taking successive actions to help stem the attack on the two big economies, on the other. A temporary turning point in this standoff occurred in early 2012 when the two large Long Term
Refi nancing Operations (LTROs) from the European Central Bank, with a combined amount of about €1 trillion, provided temporary relief from market pressures. By March of 2012, however, the further unraveling of economic management in Greece and a risk of its exit from the euro spurred a resurgence of risk spreads, so that by mid-year interest rates in Spain, and to a lesser extent Italy, were back close to peak levels. (Increasing evidence of Spain's diffi culties in meeting fi scal targets also contributed to the rebound in interest rates for Spain.) Th e escalation of the euro authorities' policy response at the end of June in endorsing a banking union and willingness for the ESM to lend directly to Spanish banks rather than to the sovereign represented the latest round in this war of nerves between the offi cial sector and the markets.
It has become a press cliché that 7 percent has been the threshold at which interest rates have forced euro area economies into bailout programs, which have their own contamination dynamics as they raise the specter of seniority of offi cial funds and hence higher risk of private creditor losses. I showed in Cline (2012b) that actually Italy could withstand even interest rates of 7 percent for several years, because the gradual rather than sudden rollover of its long-term debt combined with the debt servicing power of its prospectively high primary surpluses meant that its debt would not spiral out of control even with sustained interest rates on this order, although it would not make the progress in reducing its debt ratios otherwise possible with more reasonable interest rates.
It is useful to revisit this question using the framework developed in the present study, and to include an examination of it for Spain as well as Italy. Figures 4 and 5 show the baseline paths of debt relative to GDP along with three successively more adverse scenarios. First, the high-interest case (HI); second, the high-interest case plus the low-primary-surplus case (HI+LPS); and third, the high-interest case plus the low-primary-surplus case plus the low-growth case (HI+LPS+LG). For Spain these successively more unfavorable outcomes correspond to the 44th percentile for the baseline, then the 64th, 91st, and 99th percentiles respectively for the successively worse cases. Th e corresponding percentiles for
Italy are 39, 56, 96, and 99.
13. Datastream.
Figures 4 and 5 provide further support for the view in Cline (2012b) that even high interest rates on the order of 7 to 7.5 percent could be sustained for a long time so long as Italy (and in the present analysis, Spain) manage to achieve their baseline fi scal targets. Th e damage done to debt sustainability is considerably greater for a slip from the baseline primary surplus path to the low primary surplus path than is the damage done by higher interest rates, as shown by the substantially wider gap between the second and third lines from the bottom in both fi gures (adding the low primary surplus) than between the bottom and second lines (adding high interest rates). Th e width of the gaps between the paths similarly indicates that even the slip to the lower growth path, which has about the same debt/GDP boosting impact as higher interest rates, is considerably less damaging to debt sustainability than a slip to lower primary surpluses.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
A central implication of the analysis here is that both Spain and Italy remain solvent. Even in the 75th percentile adverse case, Spain's ratio of debt to GDP reaches only about 100 percent of GDP by 2020
and is not on an explosively rising path; and even in the 75th percentile adverse case, Italy's debt to GDP ratio is lower in 2020 than in 2013, down to 116 percent from a peak of 124 percent. Th e probabilityweighted scenarios yield a debt ratio of 92 percent in 2020 for Spain and 109 percent for Italy, representing a plausible limit on further debt buildup in Spain and progress in reducing relative indebtedness in Italy. So the basic strategy so far in the European debt crisis has been appropriate: Th e two large at-risk debtors have been and should continue to be treated as solvent and capable of carrying their debt rather than requiring some form and extent of debt forgiveness.
A parallel implication, however, is that successful achievement of fi scal targets is central to the speed of improvement in the debt outlook, for Italy, and degree of avoidance of further debt build-up, for Spain.
To be sure, the IMF (2012b) has recently emphasized that the fi scal targets should be pursued in terms of specifi c policy measures rather than nominal balance outcomes, because the latter can be distorted by cyclical downturns and rigid adherence to the nominal target under such conditions could deepen a recession. Th e key role played by the fi scal path suggests the importance of including fi scal conditionality in such policy solutions as some form of euro bond. 
SCENARIO ANALYSIS WITH CORRELATED CONTINGENT STATES
Many areas of policy analysis draw upon projections to evaluate the merits and feasibility of alternative policy choices. For example, decisions about fi scal reform depend in part on projections of future ratios of public debt to GDP. Typically projection analyses will include a "baseline" central case, and one or more "alternative" projection paths under diff erent assumptions for the key variables. When there are a number of crucial variables, and it is desirable to give reasonable consideration to alternative future "states" for each of them, the resulting number of possible outcomes multiplies quickly. Suppose, for example, that there are four key variables, and for each it is desired to take account of a central, bad, and good outcome.
Th en there will be 3 4 = 81 possible scenarios.
A fan diagram can then be used to indicate the range and likelihood of the likely time paths across the various scenarios. Th e extreme perimeter on the unfavorable side will be that scenario that combines all of the "bad" outcomes on all of the key variables. Conversely, the single scenario combining all of the "good" outcomes for the key variables will be the favorable perimeter. Th e base or central case will lie somewhere in between. For example, in a fan diagram with the debt/GDP ratio on the y-axis and time on the x-axis, the unfavorable perimeter might show a substantial increase in the debt burden over time; the baseline might show the debt ratio unchanged; and the favorable perimeter might show the debt burden falling over time.
Th e likelihood of a given range of scenarios can then be examined by the distribution of the scenarios around the central baseline scenario. Suppose for simplicity that the good, central, and bad cases on each of the variables are treated as having equal probability. Th e baseline scenario will be that combination for the "central" variant on each variable. Out of the 81 paths (for the example with 4 variables and three outcome states), there will be 40 paths less favorable than the baseline and 40 more favorable. Suppose the paths are arrayed from least to most favorable. Th en the 20th path would represent the 25th percentile (0.25 x 81  20), and the 61st path would be the 75th percentile. If each of the four variables were equally important in determining the outcome, the 20th path would be representative of the 16th through 31st paths, all of which would be identical in that they represent one central case, one good case, and two bad cases. Similarly, the 75th percentile would be representative of cases 51 through 66, all of which would have one central case, one bad case, and two good cases.
14 In a real economic problem, the infl uences of each of the key variables will not all be equal.
Importantly, their distribution of states will tend to show some correlation, rather than being independent of each other. For example, in arriving at a "good" outcome for the prospective debt ratio (stable or falling over time), the occurrence of the "good" state for economic growth as an infl uence will tend to coincide with the occurrence of the "good" state for the market risk premium spread (low spread) in so far as investors have more confi dence when the economy is growing faster. Th ere can also be negative correlation.
Suppose for example that a larger trade defi cit is perceived as "bad" for country creditworthiness. In this case there can be a negative correlation between the state for growth (good for high growth) and the state for current account (large defi cit and hence "bad" when growth is strong). If in practice the states tend to be positively correlated (for most variables the good outcomes occur when the outcomes are also good on the other variables), then the distribution of outcomes will no longer be accurately represented by the random distribution discussed above. Indeed, in the extreme in which there is 100 percent positive correlation between all of the states, the distribution would collapse to three cases, one each for bad, base case, and good. If the states tend to be positively correlated, the gap will tend to be wider between the central baseline case and either the 25th percentile or 75th percentile cases than if there is no scenario correlation, because the correlations of bad with bad cases and good with good cases will tend to generate clustering of outcomes close to the bad and good perimeters. Contingent case correlation will thus essentially widen the range of uncertainty around the central baseline. Conversely, if the state correlations are predominantly negative, the eff ect will be to push the 25th and 75th percentile outcomes toward the baseline.
Th e likelihood of a particular overall outcome will depend on the probabilities of the states for each variable and the correlations of these probabilities. In the simple case with three equally likely states for each variable and zero correlation across variables, we have the example given above for the 81 outcomes. Figure 1 shows a histogram for these outcomes, where the measure of the outcome is simply the average score across the four variables with each variable at 1 for bad, 2 for base case, and 3 for favorable.
Th e introduction of correlations across scenarios will alter the profi le of the outcomes shown in the fi gure. What follows is an operational example of the identifi cation of scenario probabilities for the case of fi ve underlying economic variables and three states (bad, base, favorable).
First, defi ne an array of possible scenarios. With fi ve variables and three states, there are 3 5 = 243 possible scenarios. Using 1, 2, and 3 as the states for each variable, and using the fi rst subscript to refer to the fi rst variable, the second to the second, and so forth, then the fi rst scenario will be S11111, the second scenario S11112, and so forth up to the fi nal scenario S33333. For example, scenario S13211 will be the scenario in which the fi rst variable takes the bad state (1), the second variable the favorable state (3), the third variable the base state (2), the fourth variable the bad state (1), and the fi fth variable the bad state (1).
A tractable if ad hoc way of proceeding is to posit that if a variable is at its base state, the probability of the case from the standpoint of that variable is a standard "central" probability, set for example at 0.4.
However, if the variable is at either its bad or favorable state, then if all other variables are at their base 23 states, its probability (from the standpoint of the single variable) will be the "alternate" probability, in this case 0.3 (that is: 0.3 bad + 0.4 base + 0.3 favorable = 1).
Correlation among variables can then be incorporated as follows. Defi ne  as the probability if the variable is in its base-case state; defi ne  as the probability if it is in either its favorable or unfavorable state and all other variables are in their base-case state (with  = 0.4 and  = 0.3 in the example here). Let  ij be defi ned as the correlation coeffi cient between the states of variable i and variable j. Defi ne "" as the increment in the probability that a variable is in its bad (favorable) state when another variable with which it is positively correlated is in its bad (favorable) state.
Th e probability that a particular variable "i" will take a particular state "s" in a particular scenario "k" will then be calculated as:
where "A" is the set of other variables that are in the same state as variable i (for example, at bad state "1" when for variable "i" the state is s=1), and "B" is the set of other variables that are at the opposite state from that of variable "i" (in this example, at s=3 instead of 1).
Calibrating the size of the probability increment  will depend on the number of variables and on the desired ratio of the probability in the case that the variable in question is at the highest likely state when the other variables are in their non-base states to the corresponding lowest probability. In the fi ve-variable case, potentially there would be an additive amount of 4 for the case in which the four other variables are all in their state that is associated with the good state of the variable in question. Suppose one seeks the maximum probability for a non-base case, for the variable in question, to be three times the opposite-state non-base probability. For the base probability  =0.4, this condition is met at  =0.0375.
Th at is: the high non-base probability will be 0.3+4(0.0375) = 0.45; the low non-base probability will be 0.3-4(0.0375) = 0.15.
Across the 243 scenarios (fi ve variable case), the unadjusted probability of the particular scenario k will then be:
A fi nal adjustment is then necessary to take account of the fact that it will only be by chance that the construction of the weighted probabilities taking account of correlations will yield a sum of unity probability across all scenarios. Th e fi nal adjusted probability of the particular scenario k is then:
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If there is some outcome variable that serves as a summary measure, such as the debt to GDP ratio in the terminal year, then the scenarios can be arrayed in order based on the value of this measure. Th e cumulative sum of the probabilities of the scenarios thus arrayed can then be observed to derive overall inferences from the projections. For example, it might be that in the full set of projections, with their weighted probabilities and taking into account likely correlations among the variables, the central estimate for the debt ratio will be 90 percent of GDP in 2020; the most favorable outcome, 70 percent; the least favorable outcome, 125 percent; and the 33th and 67th percentiles in the distribution of outcomes, debt ratios of (say) 80 percent and 112 percent respectively.
Th e overall eff ect of this approach is to provide a somewhat greater sense of the realism of alternative outcomes than would otherwise be obtained solely by treating all of the possible variants as equally likely. 
SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATES
PROBABILITY-WEIGHTED VERSUS BASELINE PROJECTIONS
Th e approach in this study incorporates correlation between the non-base scenarios to obtain a sense of the probability of alternative outcomes. As indicated in appendix A, the principal infl uence of taking correlations into account will be to spread the 25th and 75th percentiles toward the extremes, if the important correlations between the cases are positive (good with good), or toward the baseline if the dominant correlations are negative (good with bad).
Th e results here for both Spain and, to a greater degree, Italy, show that the probability-weighted outcomes are worse than the baseline outcomes. Th e divergences raise the question of whether the diff erences arise from the particular confi gurations of correlations between the non-base scenarios, or from something else. It turns out that the main cause of this outcome is indeed something else: a wider "distance" in the scenario specifi cations between the baseline and the adverse scenario than between the baseline and the favorable scenario. With equal probability being attached to the adverse and favorable scenarios, abstracting from non-base correlations, the eff ect is to make the probability-weighted outcome less favorable than the baseline.
For Italy, the unfavorable primary surplus scenario has an average primary surplus in 2013-20 that is lower than the corresponding average in the baseline by 1.9 percent of GDP; the favorable scenario's average outcome is higher by only 0.5 percent. Similarly, the interest rate scenarios show a wider distance on the unfavorable side (1.58 percentage point average higher interest rate than in the baseline) than on the favorable side (0.42 percentage point lower than in the baseline).
In contrast, the correlation of scenarios has little infl uence on the diff erence between the baseline and the probability-weighted outcome. Although positive correlation between the non-base scenarios would move the frequency distribution of the outcomes towards the extremes, and negative correlation would move it toward the baseline (appendix A), it is unlikely to change the probility-weighted averages.
Tests for Italy indicate that when the correlation coeffi cients are all set to zero, the debt ratios for 2020 are 100 percent for the 25th percentile and 117 percent for the 75th percentile. In the main results these two outcomes are 102 percent and 116 percent. So incorporation of the correlations pushes frequencies away from the extremes toward the baseline (104 percent in 2020). Th e implication is that for Italy the dominant state correlations are negative, particularly that between the privatization and primary surplus states. In contrast, there is no diff erence between the time path of the probability-weighted debt ratio for the test in which correlations are set to zero and the probability-weighted debt ratio in the main results.
Both show the debt ratio easing to 109 percent of GDP by 2020.
